The Santiago theory of cognition provides an unusual characterization of cognition. Instead of seeing cognition in more traditional ways such as the processing of symbolic information according to syntactic rules, or other such information-processing definitions, the Santiago theory describes cognition as the *process* of life. As life can be characterized as an [[Autopoiesis|autopoietic]] system embedded in a [[Dissipative Structures|dissipative structure]], we can continue along this path to describe the process of life as cognition. This is essentially what the Santiago theory does. An autopoietic system is based on a [[Networks|network]] pattern, and when the environment interacts with the system, it can prompt changes in the network pattern. This is known as structural coupling; the structure of the system changes in response to perturbations. Any time that network changes are **specified and directed** by an organism in response to some environmental perturbation, the organism has performed a cognitive act. The consequence of such a view is that all living organisms are cognitive systems, and the features of the world that prompt perturbations in the organism are the features which characterize the world for that organism. So not only are living systems seen to be cognitive systems, but the act of cognition is what generates the experience of a world for the organism. Most organisms only respond to external perturbations, and so only bring forth an external world. Organisms of sufficient complexity also perform cognitive acts in response to internal perturbations, and so can be said to bring forth an internal world. Bringing forth an internal world presents the phenomenon of self-awareness, which is basically described as consciousness in the Santiago theory. Such an internal world provides an explanation for language. Communication is easily described as the exchange of cognitive acts between multiple organisms, but language requires another step: language is communication *about* communication. Without an internal world capable of referencing previous communications, there is no capacity for language. This explains our use of language, as when we refer to a previous communication ("I tried to hold your hand because I like you!"), we are using language. This explains the creation of objects ("I keep telling you to sit down on that thing, so let's call it the 'blue chair' so that you know what I want you to sit on.") as linguistic distinctions, and as we tease out specific features of such objects, we begin to move into the territory of the abstract. --- #Psychology/Cognition #Philosophy/Mind *May 29, 2021* #2021/5